Important excerpts from
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
1. Every art or applied science, and every systematic investigation, and
similarly every action and choice, seem to aim at some good; the good,
therefore has been well defined as that at which all things aim: in some cases
the activity is the end, in others the end is some product beyond the
activity. In cases where the end lies beyond the action the product is
naturally superior to the activity. Since there are many activities, arts, and
sciences, the number of ends is correspondingly large...
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2. Now if there exists an end in the realm of action which we desire for its
own sake, an end which determines all our other desires; if, in other words, we
do not make all our choices for the sake of something else,...then obviously
this end will be the good, that is, the highest good. Will not the
knowledge of this good, consequently, be very important to our lives?... If so,
we must try to comprehend in outline at least what this good is and to which
branch of knowledge or to which capacity it belongs. This good, one should
think, belongs to the most sovereign and most comprehensive master science, and
politics clearly fits this description. For it determines which sciences
ought to exist in states, what kind of sciences each group of citizens must
learn, and what degree of proficiency each must attain. We observe
further that the most honored capacities, such as strategy, household
management, and oratory, are contained in politics. Since this science
uses the rest of the sciences, and since, moreover, it legislates what people
are to do and what they are not to do, its ends seems to embrace the ends of
the other sciences. Thus it follows that the end of politics is the good
for man. For even if the good is the same for the individual and the
state, the good of the state is the greater and more perfect thing to attain
and to safeguard.
* * * * * *
3.)...a young man is not equipped to be a student of politics; for he has no
experience in the actions which life demands of him, and these actions form the
basis and subject matter of the discussion. Moreover, since he follows
his emotions, his study will be pointless and unprofitable, for the end of this
kind of study is not knowledge but action. Whether he is young in years or
immature in character makes no difference, for his deficiency is not a matter
of time but of living and of pursuing his interests under the influence of his
emotions. Knowledge brings no benefit to this kind of person, just as it
brings none to the morally weak. But those who regulate their desires and
actions by a rational principle will greatly benefit from a knowledge of this
subject.
* * * * * *
4.) ...since all knowledge and every choice is directed toward some
good, let us discuss what is in our view the aim of politics, i.e., the highest
good attainable by action. As far as its name is concerned, most people
would probably agree: for both the common run of people and cultivated men call
it happiness (eudaimonia), and understand by "being happy" the same
as "living well" and "doing well." But when it comes
to defining what happiness is, they disagree, and the account given by the
common run differs from that of the philosophers. The former say it is
some clear and obvious good, such as pleasure, wealth, or honor; some say it is
one thing and others another, and often the very same person identifies it with
different things at different times: when he is sick he thinks it is health,
and when he is poor he says it is wealth; and when people are conscious of
their own ignorance, the admire those who talk above their heads in accents of
greatness. Some thinkers used to believe that there exists over and above
these many goods another good, good in itself and by itself, which also is the
cause of good in all these things.
* * * * * *
5.) ...to be a competent student of what is right and just, and of politics
generally, one must first have received a proper upbringing in moral conduct.
* * * * * *
6.) It is not unreasonable that men should derive their concept of the good
and of happiness from the lives which they lead. The common run of people
and the most vulgar identify it with pleasure, and for that reason are
satisfied with a life of enjoyment. For the most notable kinds of life
are three: the life just mentioned, the political life, and the contemplative
life. The common run of people, as we saw, betray their utter slavishness
in their preference for a life suitable to cattle.... Cultivated and active
men, on the other hand, believe the good to be honor, for honor, one might say,
is the end of the political life. But this is clearly too superficial an
answer: for honor seems to depend on those who confer it rather than on him who
receives it, whereas our guess is that the good is a man's own possession which
cannot easily be taken away from him. Furthermore,...they want to be honored on
the basis of their virtue or excellence (arete). Obviously, then, excellence (arete, or "virtue" ),
as far as they are concerned, is better than honor. One might perhaps
even go so far as to consider excellence (arete) rather than honor the end of
political life. However, even excellence proves to be imperfect as an
end: for a man might possibly possess it while asleep or while being inactive
in all his life, and while, in addition, undergoing the greatest suffering and
misfortune. Nobody would call the life of such a man happy, except for
the sake of maintaining an argument.... In the third place there is the
contemplative life, which we shall examine later on.
* * * * * *
7....the term "good" has as many meanings as the word
"is": it is used to describe substances, e.g., divinity and
intelligence are good; qualities, e.g., the virtues are good; quantities, e.g.,
the proper amount is good; time, e.g., the right moment is good; place, e.g., a
place to live is good; and so forth. It is clear, therefore, that the
good cannot be something universal, common to all cases, and single; for it if
were, it would not be applicable in all categories but only in one.
* * * * * *
8. [Good] is evidently something different in different actions and in
each art; it is one thing in medicine, another in strategy, and another again
in each of the other arts. What then, is the good of each? Is it
not that for the sake of which everything else is done? That means it is
health in the case of medicine, victory in the case of strategy, a house in the
case of building, a different thing in the case of different arts, and in all
actions and choices it is the end. For it is for the sake of the end that
all else is done. Thus, if there is some one end for all that we do, this
would be the good attainable by action; if there are several ends, they will be
the goods attainable by action. ...Since there are evidently several ends, and
since we choose some of these...as a means to something else, it is obvious
that not all ends are final. The highest good, on the other hand, must be
something final.... What is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a
means to something else is called final in the unqualified sense. This
description seems to apply to happiness above all else: for we always choose
happiness as an end in itself and never for the sake of something else.
Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all virtue we choose partly for themselves--for
we would choose each of them even if no further advantage would accrue from
them--but we also choose them partly for the sake of happiness, because we
assume that it is through them that we will be happy.
* * * * *
9. To call happiness the highest good is perhaps a little too trite,
and a clearer account of what it is, is still required. Perhaps this is
best done by first ascertaining the proper function of man.... the goodness and
performance of man would seem to reside in whatever is his proper
function....What can this function possible be? Simply living? He
shares that even with plants, but we are now looking for something peculiar to
man. Accordingly, the life of nutrition and growth must be
excluded. Next in line there is a life of sense perception. But
this, too, man has in common with the horse, the ox, and every animal.
There remains then an active life of the rational element. The rational
element has two parts: one is rational in that it obeys the rule of reason, the
other in that it possesses and conceives rational rules. Since the
expression "life of the rational element" also can be used in two
senses, we must make it clear that we mean a life determined by the activity,
as opposed to the mere possession, of the rational element....The proper
function of man, then, consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a
rational principle or, at least, not without it. In speaking of the
proper function of a given individual we mean that it is the same in kind as
the function of an individual who sets high standards for himself: the proper
function of a harpist, for example, is the same as the function of a harpist
who has set high standards for himself. The same applies to any and every
group of individuals: the full attainment of excellence must be added to the
mere function. In other words, the function of the harpist is to play the
harp; the function of the harpist who has high standards is to play it well. On these assumptions, if we take the proper function of man to be a certain
kind of life, and if this kind of life is an activity of the soul and consists
in actions performed in conjunction with the rational element, and if a man of
high standards is he who performs these actions well and properly, and if a
function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the
excellence appropriate to it; we reach the conclusion that the good of man is
an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there
are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete. But we must
add "in a complete life." For one swallow does not make a spring, nor
does one sunny day; similarly, one day or a short time does not make a man
blessed and happy.
* * * * * *
10. Virtue...consists of two kinds, intellectual virtue and moral
virtue. Intellectual virtue or excellence owes its origin and development
chiefly to teaching, and for that reason requires experience and time. Moral virtue, on the other hand, is formed by habit, ethos, and its name, ethike,
is therefore derived, by a slight variation, from ethos. This shows, too, that
none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by nature, for nothing which
exists by nature can be changed by habit. For example, it is impossible
for a stone, which has a natural downward movement, to become habituated to
moving upward, even if one should try ten thousand times to inculcate the habit
by throwing it in the air...Thus the virtues are implanted in us neither by
nature nor contrary to nature; we are by nature equipped with the ability to
receive them, and habit brings this ability to completion and
fulfillment....The virtues...we acquire by first having put them into action,
and the same is also true of the arts. For the things which we have to
learn before we can do them we learn by doing: men become builders by building houses,
and harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, we become just by the practice of
just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by
performing acts of courage. This is corroborated by what happens in states.
Lawmakers make the citizens good by inculcating good habits in them, and this
is the aim of every lawgiver. ...characteristics develop from corresponding
activities. For that reason, we must see to it that our activities are of a
certain kind, since any variations in them will be reflected in our
characteristics. Hence, it is no small matter whether one habit or
another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a
considerable difference, or, rather, all the difference.
* * * * * *
11. The nature of moral qualities is such that they are destroyed by
defect and by excess. We see the same thing happen in the case of
strength and of health, to illustrate, as we must, the invisible by means of
visible examples: excess as well as deficiency of physical exercise destroys
our strength, and similarly, too much and too little food and drink destroys
our health; the proportionate amount, however, produces, increases, and
preserves it. The same applies to self-control, courage, and the other
virtues: the man who shuns and fears everything and never stands his ground
becomes a coward, whereas a man who knows no fear at all and goes to meet every
danger becomes reckless. Similarly, a man who revels in every pleasure
and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while he who avoids every
pleasure like a boor becomes what might be called insensitive. Thus we
see that self-control and courage are destroyed by excellence and by deficiency
and are preserved by the mean.
* * * * * *
12....moral excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain; it is pleasure
that makes us do base actions and pain that prevents us from doing noble
actions. For that reason, as Plato says, men must be brought up from
childhood to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things; for this is correct
education.
* * * * * *
13. In the arts, excellence lies in the result itself, so that it is sufficient
if it is of a certain kind. But in the case of the virtues an act is not
performed justly or with self-control if the act itself is of a certain kind,
but only if in addition the agent has certain characteristics as he performs
it; first of all, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to
act the way he does, and he must choose it for its own sake; and in the third
place, the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable character....for the
mastery of the virtues,... knowledge is of little or no importance, whereas the
other two conditions count not for a little but are all-decisive, since
repeated acts of justice and self-control result in the possession of these
virtues. In other words, acts are called just and self-controlled when they are
the kind of acts which a just or self-controlled man would perform; but the
just and self-controlled man is not he who performs these acts, but he who also
performs them in the way just and self-controlled men do.
* * * * * *
14. We may thus conclude that virtue or excellence is a characteristic
involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a
mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical
wisdom would use to determine it.
* * * * * *
15....happiness is activity in conformity with virtue....
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16. A man whose activity is guided by intelligence, who cultivates his
intelligence and keeps it in the best condition, seems to be the most beloved
of the gods.
Summary
Aristotle's View of Virtue